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The Political Theology of Violence in
Contemporary India
Thomas Blom Hansen
1 What are we to make of the fact that most violence in India is rarely presented, or rarely
presents itself, through visible actors, or through people taking responsibility for bombs,
riots, arson and looting?1 Why is most violence represented by the police, by political
parties and by those perpetrating the violence as a form of spontaneous combustion
expressing seething anger, collective outrage and a deep sense of hurt? Why are bomb
blasts,  mob violence,  arson and other  atrocities  happening  without  anyone  claiming
responsibility afterwards, without anyone providing justifications? Why are violent acts
portrayed neither as homicides nor crimes but instantly metaphorized as expressions of
collective emotions? In a country so saturated in political rhetoric it seems paradoxical
that  acts  of  violence  have  acquired  their  own  semiotic  register,  a  singular  form  of
political ‘communication’. What is the cultural logic of this portrayal of violence as quasi-
natural events without actors?
2 I  use  the  term  political  theology  as  a  reference  to  Carl  Schmitt’s  problematic  yet
insightful idea of the decision as the heart of political life. Schmitt suggests that ‘the
analogy of the miracle in theology is the exception in jurisprudence’ (Schmitt 1922: 9). His
discussion centres around a neo-Hobbesian interpretation of  the state as founded on
violence and the capacity to decide on the norm—politically and legally – that is the
‘miracle’ in political life, the omnipresence of the state as a deus ex machina, an entity that
becomes surrounded by magical properties because of its ultimate control of violence and
its  capacity  to  authorize  (arbitrary)  definitions  of  the  normal,  and to  decide  on the
suspension of the law in a state of exception.2
3 What I  mean by political  theology of  violence here is  something related,  yet slightly
different: how acts of violence are interpreted and understood as signs of something else
standing behind it; a sovereign will, a collective force of outrage and anger, a historical
revenge, or even the ‘hand of God’.  This is pertinent in the context of India because
violence—acts of terror or ‘faceless’ mob violence—is so often interpreted as quasi natural
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reactions, as actions without actors. This is akin to the staging of acts of terror as ‘pure
effects’ that are only attributed causes and reasons after the fact, as Faisal Devji puts it in
his work on Jihadist thought (Devji 2006).
 
Crowd violence, the unknowable monster
4 It has been demonstrated very well by Gyan Pandey (Pandey 1990) that the colonial idea
of the crowd in India was one of a faceless, aggressive, unfathomable, irrational compact
of people in the thralls of religious passion and beyond the comprehension of colonial
sociology. The explanations of riots varied from religious fanaticism gripping the great
unwashed,  to  instigation  by  the habitual  criminal,  the badmash ,  or to  instigation by
people with political  agendas—educated and respectable people who had turned into
dangerous political activists. The effects were dangerous and destructive crowds that had
to be dealt with through overwhelming and resolute force. The manuals of policing of the
colonial state spoke at length about the need for an extraordinarily firm hand in the East
(Chandavarkar 1998). 
5 This style of policing, and the view of crowds as a destructive, wild power rising from the
people,  still  prevails  in  the  legal  system,  in  the  police  academies,  and  in  police
compounds. In this view, crowds are faceless, have an almost magical form of agency that
cannot  be  accounted for  or  fully  understood—just  met  with overwhelming force.  No
individual culpability is normally attached, or sought, even in cases of extensive crowd
violence.3 The cult of the ‘super cop’, the man of steel cleaning up ubiquitous dirt and
corruption is well and alive in modern India. The proliferating crime channels on Indian
TV channels tend to reproduce and reinforce the notion of the men in khaki as a thin
brown line defending respectable society against its enemies.
6 Among many poor people,  similar  perceptions are often heard:  riots  or  marches are
organized  by  ‘political  people’,  by  troublemakers,  by  criminal  elements  and  so  on.
However, there is also a widespread endorsement of such actions—that outrage, anger or
frustration somehow naturally manifests themselves in crowds that can easily turn irate,
and commit  acts  of  violence  and destruction.  Collective  outrage,  anger  and political
passions are emotions that  routinely are accepted to be beyond reason and civilized
discussion and they are, indeed, deeply legitimate forms of political expression in India. 
7 There are limits,  however,  and for  most  people the killing of  someone in a  political
protest almost invariably marks a critical threshold that changes everything. Protests
against officialdom, even the wrecking and destruction of public property, are widely
considered  legitimate—not  desirable  but  understandable.  A  death  caused  by  reckless
firing by police officers on a crowd or people protesting can, in most cases, produce a
legitimate martyr in the wider public. The main exception to this rule is that of Muslims
and tribal communities where deaths at the hand of the authorities are usually portrayed
in the wider public as self-inflicted and fully deserved results of  extreme aggression.
Muslims and Tribals are seen as martyrs within their own communities but not in the
wider political community.
8 In  the  case  of  communal  violence  during  riots,  the  moral  value  of  death  is  rather
different. The killing of an individual from another community in the context of an all-
out  confrontation  in  streets  and  neighbourhoods  is  abundant with  significance.  The
category of ‘the other’ almost invariably overshadows the identity of the individual. Riot
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situations  suspend  most  parameters  of  appropriate  behaviour,  proportionality  and
justice. Instead, intense feelings of fear, anger and revenge take over along with forms of
wild enjoyment, exhilaration, shame and guilt.
9 There  are  in  other  words,  two  categories  of  public  violence—both  of  which  mark  a
breaking of a norm and the creation of an exceptional situation, both of which are widely
endorsed and perfectly legitimate elements of political life in the wider population.
10 The first,  and by far the most widespread and routinized form of  public  violence,  is
protests against the state, or any kind of official, by crowds gathering, pelting stones,
attacking and destroying public property. How did this become a form of legitimate and
deeply routinized violence? I can think of three reasons:
11 1.  The  legacy  of  the  anti-colonial  struggle  created  political  languages  and  forms  of
manifestations that are still alive and have been enormously revived in the 1970s protests
against the state and Indira Gandhi’s increasing centralism. Today, the register of public
protests, of breaking the law peacefully—the dharna, the rasta roko, hunger strikes, etc.—
are deeply embedded, even banalized, across the Indian political landscape as a set of
possible languages of political expression and dissent.
12 As we know, Gandhi skilfully recruited and mobilized the visceral power of the crowd and
the moral purity of communities formed in opposition to unjust rule. But it was always a
precarious balance, always a knife’s edge balancing between peaceful protest and all out
communal killings, as in the 1920s, and in Bengal in the 1940s at the eve of independence.
13 After  independence,  the  state  was  suddenly  a  national  state  in  the  hands  of  a  new
national elite but the language of public protest prevailed. The difference was now that
the police had to restrain themselves, and that the moral force of such anti-government
crowds were of a different nature. Yet, the Gandhian ethos persisted and turned into
maybe the most legitimate of all public actions in modern India: the anti political register
that opposes the state or officialdom, or corruption, by disavowing ‘power politics’ and
representing the purity of the people, as condensed in the austere and self-abnegating
body of the hunger striker, or the political ascetic who invariably disavows politics and
calls himself a social worker.
14 A socialist /Gandhian member of the West Bengal assembly stated in 1955:
As  regards  to  laws,  I  would  like  to  mention  with  all  humility  that  under  the
leadership of the father of the nation we have been taught to break lawless laws,
and  we  will  need  to  break  laws  again….  To  us  life  is  more  precious  than  legal
forms… We may be tear-gassed and there might be lathi charge, but it is a legitimate
action to commit satyagraha. In a demonstration the people must have the right to
violate  the  law.  Peacefully,  of  course.  If  there  is  violence,  it  is  because  the
government acts violently, not the people.4
15 In this rendition, which could have been spoken last year, the state and not the people is
the source of violence. The community, the people (samaj, log), are pure at heart, are not
infected by ‘bad’ self-interested electoral politics, their anger is always legitimate and
righteous. This is the repertoire of ‘anti-politics’ at its purest. This principle of legitimate
protests has long been established in modern Indian public life, to the point that such
public violence is now routinized as one of the most legitimate and expected forms of
political action.
16 2. The second explanation is that public violence is a form of collective catharsis. The
highly ritualized negotiations between crowds and officials representing the state are a
‘political good’ that Indian democracy has made available to ordinary people, a safety
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valve that involves periodical public humiliation of public officials. This is a thesis that
Dipesh Chakrabarty has put forward in a recent paper (Chakrabarty 2007). He suggests
that  a  mutual  ritual  economy  has  developed  between  local  communities  and  state
officials. For local people, there is the satisfaction of forcing high-ranking officials to eat
humble pie, to apologize in public, and to promise to improve services or rectify an error.
After an apology has been issued by the official, the crowd will disperse, and the short
lived experience of being ‘the people, or ‘the public’ representing society, of occupying
the  moral  high ground as  legitimate  political  actors  come to  an  end.  In  most  cases
nothing  happens,  however,  until  the  next  protest,  and  another  officer  in  charge  is
transferred. 
17 There is in this a strong element of the ‘leveling’ that Tambiah analyzes in his book on
crowd violence; the pleasure of immersing one self in a crowd and to make a feared and
powerful opponent fear you, to reduce him/them to the same level as yourself (Tambiah
1996). On the side of the officials, it is a well-known fact that being an officer in charge
may involve periodical displays of humility before angry crowds. It is regarded as merely
an unfortunate circumstance, a part of the environment, but also something that can be
dangerous if politicians interfere or force transfers. Most judicious bureaucrats are well
aware of the need to go along with this ritualized exchange of protest, humiliation and
apologies. 
18 It would be tempting to look at this as a ritual cycle through Victor Turner’s template of
the dialectic between the norm and its temporary suspension. To Turner, the intense
form of communitas experienced through rituals serve to renew and re-integrate social
compacts  and  relationships  (Turner  1974).  However,  our  third  possible  explanation,
which  I  will  call  the  imperative  of  visibility  and  improvised  performance,  seems  to
foreclose such functional explanations. 
19 3.  One  of  the  most  compelling  dynamics  of  democracy  is  that  it  foregrounds
representation and visibility. A community, a cause, a grievance, a feeling of hurt and
outrage must be made visible and audible—it must be enacted in public to be recognized
as real and compelling. The noise and destruction of property by a crowd is, in other
words, a necessity for those who want to project themselves as angry in order to seek
public recognition of this anger. The violent act is thus always interpreted as a sign of
something else, something bigger than itself. Yet, the crowd is also something in its own
right—unpredictable,  unstable,  slightly  out  of  control  and  thus  open  to  many
interpretations.
20 Staging collective anger and outrage through public violence is  always a risky if  not
dangerous  game  for  movements  and  individuals,  a  game  where  one  risks  forfeiting
goodwill and legitimacy. Yet performing public violence is at the same time imperative if
one  is  to  demonstrate  and  perform  the  depth  and  authenticity  of  the  anger  and
resentment that a movement, or party, claims to represent. In my earlier work I quote a
somewhat comical instance of this imperative of violent action when a Shiv Sena Mayor
reacted against the arrest of Bal Thackeray by the state authorities by leaving his mayoral
office, only to lead a crowd that in turn attacked and burned his own office in Thane city
(Hansen 2001: 227)!
21 But let us move to the second kind of violence I mentioned above, the communal crowd
violence. Here, another, more dangerous, and more ambiguous moral game is played out.
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Crowds and fire in India
22 The  increasing  political  violence  in  India  during  the  1980s  and  1990s  was  clearly
connected with the growth of Hindu nationalist sentiments. Of these organizations, the
Shiv Sena in Western India is undoubtedly the most violent, plebeian and visible. This
organization  has  the  tiger  as  its  symbol  and  its  imagery  revolves  around  strength,
masculinity and the lack of fear. While it began in the 1960s as an organization defending
the Maharashtra dharma and the interests of Marathi speakers in the city of Bombay
(Katzenstein 1979; Gupta 1982), the organization has in the past decades styled itself as
the ‘fighting arm’ of the Hindu community. It glorifies the sainik, the soldier, as someone
who is in the thrall of his passions and his sense of natural justice—an elemental desire to
seek justice on the part of his community, to defend his family and neighbourhood. These
men, and their passions, may not be pure but their actions are purifying and cleansing
acts.
23 The theme of fire is at the heart of ideas of both passion and violence across the world. In
India,  fire  is  possibly  one  of  the  densest  cultural  metaphors  one  can  think  of.  In
established Hindu cosmology, fire signifies transformation from one state to another, a
pure  connection  as  represented  by  the  god  Agni,  But  it  also  signifies  death  and
annihilation, as well as the sacred in ubiquitous forms—from the temple fire, the lamp (
jyoti) to the fire used at marriage ceremonies (nikah) and so on. 
24 In a strict physical sense, fire is ontologically empty. There is no substance or unity to
fire, fire is only transformation that acquires specific colour, duration and heat from the
materials burning. Fire is at its purest, most transformative and warmest at the top, while
always dirtier and emitting ashes and debris at the base (Bachelard 1987).
25 The  notion  of  fire  as  pure  transformation,  a  power  that  is  both  ephemeral  and
fundamentally transformative, is at the heart of much religious imagery. Jahve makes
himself known to Moses in the desert in the form of a burning bush, and in the Hindu
mythology the god of fire, Agni (which shares the linguistic root with ignis in Latin), is
immensely powerful. Always mobile and on the move, mounted on a ram, or in a chariot
pulled by goats, Agni is the link between gods and men, and he is also the messenger
between the gods. He is ever young, reborn and relit every day and thus immortal, and
omnipresent—both in the heavens and in every person where he lightens the small flame
of being, as in every living thing. 
26 Agni is prominent in the ancient Rg Veda and was for centuries worshipped by warriors
and cults devoted to strength and virility. The use of fire became especially popularized
in the 20th century by the Arya Samaj, a modern Hindu reform movement. For the Aryas,
fire was less about Agni in his elaborate mythological form. They were more concerned
with fire as a metaphor of the sacred as such, as the centre of the hawan ceremony, the
key element in the Arya Samaj’s attempt to create simplified, portable and yet dense basic
Hindu rituals.
27 As we know, fire has another important function in India, namely the funerary rites.
When a person dies, the flame is extinguished and as soon as that happens, the corpse of
even the purest Brahmin becomes radically impure, only to be handled by the specialized
‘untouchable’ castes dealing with funerary rites. When the body is placed on top of the
fire  and  the  fire  is  lit,  it  becomes  a  sacrifice  to  Agni  and  the  body  is  once  again
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transformed into a migrating soul rising above the pure, and the waste, the ashes and the
remains that are still impure, deposited into the sacred river. This is purification and
‘distillation’ of the spirit in a very direct and tangible form (Parry 1995).
28 The notion of spontaneous anger and direct display of passion through ‘direct action’ is
central to the image created by Shiv Sena over the years. One of the movement’s slogans
goes like this: ‘A Shivsainik is like a burning torch. He shall burn the evil and he shall also
show the path of life to those who struggle in darkness’.
29 The movement’s longstanding dictatorial leader Bal Thackeray always framed himself as
the man with guts and ability to speak the truth, to defend the Hindus. For him Shiv Sena
was nothing but an expression of the Hindu will. There was nothing particularly religious
about his view. One of his saying is: ‘We are Hindustanis and therefore Hindus. We love
Hindustan more than ourselves’. To him, the love of the nation was all about spontaneous
gut feeling; dil se—from the heart. This passion was more in the sainiks than their own
will and it made them do things that would be considered transgressive, but actually were
pure because there is purity in the authentic passion—it takes you over, becomes you
more than yourself.  The  numerous  attacks  on Muslims and other  minorities  by  this
movement over the years have invariably been justified as ‘spontaneous reactions’; as
defence against a threat, or as the justified wrath of the community. A local Shiv Sena
leader told me the following:
If you do not allow me to speak how am I to express myself? I am not a beggar and
no doubt I also have some respect. There is also nature’s law and I can also use that
… The principle of  natural  justice is  accepted by us and this  is  the principle of
natural justice—whatever is mine is mine and whatever is yours is yours… It is just
like playing with fire. If you sit beside it, it will warm you, but if you play mischief
with it, it burns your house. Shiv Sena is like that.
30 As mentioned above, colonial and contemporary policing in India regarded crowds as
semi-sovereign  entities  in  that  they  could  be  dispersed  and  controlled  as  collective
entities, but individuals were never held accountable for violence or destruction in the
course of crowd action. To kill in a crowd is, in effect, to kill with impunity. Staging crowd
action as an expression of authentic public emotion and outrage is one of the oldest and
most  sophisticated  political  technologies  among  political  activists  across  the  Indian
subcontinent. This has to do with the registers of public legitimacy of collective action
within the  postcolonial  democracy I  discussed above,  but  it  also  has  to  do with the
obvious attractions, if not enjoyment, associated with crowd action.
31 To enter a crowd is to enter a momentary space of exception where normal rules of
behaviour and conduct are suspended for a time and other rules and norms prevail in the
moment  of  effervescence.  This  can  be  true  of  a  crowd carefully  staged  for  political
purposes, a spontaneous crowd gathered around a protest or an incident, or even the
destructive and enjoying football crowds described by Buford (1990). Not all crowds are
violent but once a crowd explodes in anger the ‘other’ is no longer a feared enemy but is
turned into ‘bare life’—a de-symbolized form of life that can be killed with impunity and
upon which the sovereignty of the crowd, and the community it claims to represent, can
inscribe itself (Agamben 1998). Crowds are not merely ruled by anomalous and primitive
instincts as Le Bon and Freud held. Crowds are, as Tambiah points out in his admirable
synthesis, often driven by a search for the ‘enemies’ and their property which it seeks to
destroy and level, but also to devour ‘in an almost cannibalistic fusion of self and other’
(Tambiah 1996: 275). 
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32 Crowds engage in destruction of public property and often in stylized confrontations with
the  police  that  take  the  place  of  ‘the  enemy’.  The  clue  to  an  understanding  of  the
sovereignty  of  the  crowd,  however,  short  lived  and  passing  it  may  be,  lies  in  what
Tambiah in passing calls the ‘substantialization’ that often evolves in a crowd (Tambiah
1996: 219). Tambiah understands this as the concretization of identity and community.
But it is also possible to link this to the visceral economy of the physicality of the crowd:
the sense of loss of bodily autonomy and the experience of a co-substantiality that lead
crowds to become ‘spaces of exception’—not with a single mind, but fleetingly unified by
a momentary sense of bodily authenticity, certainty and exhilaration—driven by what
Elias Canetti calls a crowd’s ‘love of density’, and therefore an entity without doubts or
fear.  Maybe we can expand Appadurai’s  idea of  ethnic violence as being driven by a
search for certainty in the body of ‘the other’ (Appadurai 1999) by recognizing that there
is also certainty and authenticity to be found in the visceral-physical compact of the
crowd.
33 Although the Hindu nationalist movement has extended the logic and justification of
crowd violence to become an index of community sovereignty, the use of the crowd and
its violence as a legitimate political  expression of anger and sovereignty is  extensive
across the political spectrum in contemporary India. As a repertoire of authority and
moral argument, ‘community’ is very powerful indeed qua its historical connotations of
delineating  a  measure  of  ‘collective  privacy’,  and  qua its  incorporation  of  issues  of
honour, family, bodies and reproduction. Most of the language of social reform through
law—reservations of jobs, constituencies, and educational opportunities—have also been
framed and justified in terms of collective predicaments of communities.5
34 Some political leaders talk about these events as the ‘opening of Shiva’s third eye’, the
ominous event  that  will  happen in times of  great  danger,  an event that  inaugurates
annihilation of the enemy. The king/leader thus makes himself into a tool of the divine,
the absolute, turning himself into God’s hand, and fire moves to the centre, once again, as
that  universal  and impersonal  force that  wreaks destruction and death.  Fire  may be
ignited by someone but once it is going, it is a force in its own right, more in us than
ourselves—something  that  is  alien  and  yet  overtakes  us  (like  the  drives  in  Freud’s
writings), it is a force that exists in the community as a potentiality—but never identical
to it. Fire is a paradoxical form of empty agency. Once fire gets going, it is a pure effect,
lacking specificity or ontology and yet behaving as a type of autonomous agency—a pure
transformation of something into nothingness.
35 In Violence and the Sacred, Rene Girard writes about the king, the fire and the absolute:
The king is both very ‘bad’ and extremely ‘good’… the king’s subjects may feel ill at
ease in his presence, awed by his sheer superabundance of power. Nevertheless,
they would be terrified if they were deprived of his presence… The absolute can be
likened to fire: too near and one gets burned, too far away and one gets nothing. In
between there is a zone where one is warmed and heartened by the welcome light
(Girard 1979:111).
36 In this rendition, fire is metonymically linked to the absolute, a powerful nothingness
that is the source of everything. When it disappears, the excitement, the exhilaration and
the potential transgression disappear. Let me return to crowds and fire where the motifs
of the transgressive and the exciting—which is in us and yet beyond us—are particularly
powerful.
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37 Let me take you to Bombay January 1993. I was in the city when it was rocked by the
largest riots ever,  framed as a Hindu revenge against the Muslim protest against the
razing of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya a month earlier. The first round of protests by
Muslims  mainly  targeted  the  institutions  of  the  state  and  more  than  two  hundred
Muslims were killed, mainly by police bullets. There were also attacks on Hindus and
Hindu dominated areas which, in turn, became the cause of the second and much larger
round of violence in the beginning of January 1993 where Shiv Sena led and encouraged
an all-out attack on Muslim neighbourhoods and businesses across the city.  This was
framed as acts of war and revenge, as blood for blood, and was provoked by the burning
to death of a Hindu family, supposedly by Muslims, in a working class area in the city.6 
38 The huge bustling city was literally silent for eight days – the most eerie silence I have
ever experienced. The odd military and police vehicle moved in the streets, and a few
taxis, one of them ferrying me. The driver was a middle-aged man, the pale shade on his
chin and cheeks betrayed a newly removed beard. Like many other Muslim men, he had
shaved off his beard to pass as a Hindu. I, the firangi, was his life insurance it dawned on
me. He was quiet, sweating profusely, nervous and tense. We drove slowly following a
military vehicle which gave us a vague sense of safety. Streets were lined with men, many
of  them  with  sticks,  knives,  bottles  with  acid  or  kerosene,  standing,  waiting  for
something, anything to happen. Many young men stood on the roof tops, with saffron
flags. Columns of smoke rose from multiple fires in the city. 
39 Suddenly the vehicle  in front  of  us  came to a  halt.  A crowd of  a  few hundred men
dispersed reluctantly. They stood around a burning car. Inside we could see a body, on
fire, twitching violently, then falling. A terrible smell of petrol, rubber and human flesh
surrounded us.  The  men looked excited,  some screamed ‘Jai  Shri  Ram’,  ‘Mussulman,
Pakistan ya Kabristan’ (‘Muslims, Pakistan or the graveyard’). Some soldiers got out, and
began to disperse the crowd. People only moved reluctantly. The commanding officer
called the soldiers back. A few minutes passed, long and tense minutes. The fire died
down gradually. A soldier put out the rest of the fire, and the crowd dispersed, silently.
The aggression was gone,  a  new fear  crept  in.  What  will  the soldiers  do? An officer
approached me, asked for papers, and passport. I asked him if they will do anything. He
shrugged and sighed: ‘This is the tenth fire we put out today… what can we do? Arrest the
people? Who has started the fire we cannot tell’.
40 The fire had gone, it had done its work, ‘it’ had killed another Muslim, but no one was
directly guilty. Yet they all were, and the worried grins on their faces seemed to betray
this strange guilt. A taboo had been violated, someone had been killed, the tension was
relieved  in  a  double  sense.  When  the  fire  disappeared,  the  sense  of  agency  also
evaporated. As Canetti says in his book Crowds and Power: ‘To commit a murder in a crowd,
without culpability, seems irresistible to most men’ (Canetti 1984:50).
41 However, murder is always impure, hence the great relief to have the impurity burned,
leaving no evidence,  no  direct  responsibility;  only  the  effects  of  indirect  and empty
agency. The fire can stand in for the passions and aggressions in us—our lower political
selves—always disavowed and impure and thus in need of concealment or projection onto
an external cause.
42 Canetti continues:
Fire spreads rapidly; it is contagious and insatiable; it can break out anywhere and
with great suddenness; it is multiple, it is destructive… all this is true of the crowd…
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fire is one of the most important and malleable of the crowd symbols…. The human
urge to become fire is still alive in more complex cultures (Canetti 1984: 77).
43 The army captain was right. A few miles further on, in another neighbourhood, we were
forced to stop by a couple of hundred young men in the street. Looting of a row of shops,
presumably Muslim owned,  was in progress.  The mood was exuberant,  loud but also
nervous and aggressive.  A couple of  middle-aged men supervised the scene from the
other side of the road. One of them came over and asked me questions. I whipped out a
couple of visiting cards from prominent members of Shiv Sena I had met recently. One of
them read ‘To my friend Thomas’. The young men surrounding the car, dispersed when
the man said ‘he is OK, a friend’. The taxi driver turned around and smiled thinly, as if
saying ‘phew’!
44 Suddenly someone threw a burning bottle and fire spread rapidly along the row of shops.
The mood became wilder and more exuberant. Young men were dancing, throwing things
into the flames. Alcohol was consumed. Boys holding bottles, new shirts, boxes of soap
and much else were pacing up and down the sidewalk. We could hear screams from the
inside of the shops, and the apartments upstairs. Screams of women and children. The
boys kept on dancing and chanting. All of a sudden the local leader turned his attention
to me and ordered us to leave, quickly, threatening us, leave, ‘no photos… just fuck off’.
We had witnessed something we should not,  a transgression that could no longer be
stopped, a complex economy of guilt and a fire completely out of control in more than
one sense. The face of the driver was contorted in fear and rage. ‘We can’t do anything,
let us go now’, I said in an ineffective attempt to console him.
45 Can we understand such forms of lynching, the witch burning, the annihilation of entire
families and groups inside burning houses and shops—the burning of the taxi driver—as a
sacrificial logic? As a purging of evil and danger from within the community, where the
victim stands in for the evil and the violence that is intrinsic to the community itself and
thus is a constant desire and drive that must be placated? Fire does not just kill, it also
purifies,  it transforms the impure into the elements. This is the gist of Rene Girard’s
argument but it seems too functionalist for my taste and does not account for the fact
that Muslims and Hindus see each other as utterly alien to their respective communities.
The dynamics I observed at close range in Bombay calls for something more—not just a
deep culturalist argument about Hinduism and fire—, because this touches a larger and
more general question: Why is fire used by crowds, or in ethnic cleansings, in so many
parts of the world? What are the performative elements in death by fire?
46 One  answer  must  be  one  akin  to  Bill  Buford’s  observation  in  his  book  on  football
hooliganism: ‘I am in the crowd, I am of the crowd, but the crowd is not me’ (Buford 1990:
157). Like the crowd, fire is an agency that is nobody’s, that belongs to nobody. It can be
constructed as a kind of nature unleashed, a representation of a disavowed desire that
cannot be spoken, only enacted. Fire creates an event that is of itself,  it  has its own
dynamic and force once it is ignited, yet it is also parasitical on everybody’s attention and
gaze. It is an anonymous event of eradication of life, things and property, of being—an
event that can be owned in different ways by those gathered around it. It becomes a pure
effect—  i.e. an  event  without  a  clear  cause  which  in  turn allows  for  multiple
interpretations. 
47 We can think of many such interpretations in a South Asia context—for instance the
ritual humiliation involved in actually forcing cremation upon Muslim bodies. One can
also read symbolic economies into the burning of things as a way of turning these objects
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or bodies into disposable entities, annoying waste that needs to be cleaned out akin to
what happens to clothes coloured by the multiple colours used at the Holi festival; or
perhaps akin to the status  of  the always disposable Dalit  body.  For the dancing and
drinking young men, there was indeed enjoyment, a perverse catharsis and expenditure
similar to what Bataille had in mind in his critique of functionalism and utilitarianism:
expending energy, enjoyment, destruction of objects by consumption and devouring and
even annihilation of  life  constitute  non-rational  rationales,  if  not  end-goals  of  much
human conduct (Bataille 1991). Such ambivalent energies and desires that sometimes find
an outlet in crowd violence are exactly the raw material which Hindu nationalists have
mobilized, staged and given a political direction in the last decades. This became even
more apparent in Gujarat in 2002.
 
Gujarat—transgression and new economies of
violence?
48 The anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat in February-March 2002 was a chilling demonstration
of how the RSS and BJP combine the longstanding public repertoires of crowd action as
spontaneous combustion with the use of fire as a powerful (non) agent. Fire was the lead
theme in these riots, as were the lack of direct agency, the concealment of actors. It was
all portrayed as spontaneous reactions, a form of combustion that begins as an explosion
in the heart, in reaction to a provocation or deadly threat, then a retreat of reason and
restraint, which in turn spilled over into fire and arson, burning and annihilation of the
enemies.
49 The pogrom began with a fire supposedly caused by Muslim attack on a train outside the
station in Godhra. 55 Hindu ‘temple volunteers’ returning from the holy city of Ayodhya
(where they had gone to support the controversial Ram Temple project) perished. The
subsequent pogrom against Muslims across the state lasted for weeks and left thousands
of Muslims dead, wounded and even homeless. The events were justified as a ‘natural’
reaction of the Hindu samaj as such to revenge the temple volunteers’ deaths. As so often
before, the Hindu nationalist movement sought to become and embody the community of
Hindus by killing its imagined enemies in its name. 
50 But the BJP government in Gujarat also provided crucial conditions for the pogroms by
withdrawing  or  pacifying  the  local  police  force  and  administration.  Soon  after,  the
government banned the direct reporting of the riots by privately owned TV channels.
Similarly, the central government—also dominated by the BJP—refrained from effective
measures for several days, allowing the local units of the RSS and VHP and their many
local supporters to wreak deadly revenge on Muslims all  over the state.  Although an
official inquiry into the riots was ordered, BJP asserted the de facto right to kill  with
impunity in the name of the Hindu community and its disregard for legal procedures by
staging a large gaurav yatra (pride procession) in the state in August-September. 
51 The yatra was led by the state’s BJP chief minister—who claimed to lead the procession in
his capacity as a ‘Hindu leader’. Officially, the procession aimed at commemorating the
‘Hindu martyrs’ of Godhra. However, its route through hundreds of towns in the state,
which had been the scene of arson and slaughter of Muslims a few months before, was
staged as a celebration of  the victory of  the Hindu community.  This open display of
disregard for legality demonstrated that the Hindu nationalist movement continues to
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see itself  as  representing the sovereign right of  Hindus to assert  their emotions and
religious passions vis-à-vis minorities and perceived enemies. To the BJP, the control of
state power meant that it  could stall  the assertion of the state’s formal monopoly of
legitimate violence. The government suspended the law and legal procedures, transferred
what it regarded as overly diligent police officers. Other parts of the Hindu nationalist
movement openly celebrated that the Hindu community had taken revenge, and that
natural justice in the form of ‘blood for blood’ had been exercised.
52 In Rakesh Sharma’s award winning documentary film Final Solution (2004) we see deeply
disturbing examples of all these logics: the ridiculing laughter at Muslims complaining
about their plight or remarks like ‘this is what happens when you insult the Hindu log’.
The film,  which was initially banned by the authorities,  documents plenty of  playful
rhetoric of hate. Some local leaders invoke Hanuman and suggest that his tail had set
things on fire across the state, because this is something that happens in times of danger
and war. This reduces and transforms the gruesome events into an unfolding of a timeless
mythical logic—something everybody knew was a lie and yet took comfort in invoking.
The yatra stopped at the exact places where massacres had been committed, and where
hundreds had been killed, mostly by fire. 
53 The shamefulness, the vagueness about actual events and killings, the furtive but never
open celebration of the ‘victory of the Hindus’ I experienced in Bombay and among Shiv
Sainiks after the riots was not in evidence in Rakesh Sharma’s film. On the contrary: the
film documents the open celebration of death, of the dead Muslim body as a sign of the
power and self-confidence of the Hindus. There was also an unprecedented celebration of
the 55 ‘Hindu martyrs, many of them in fact not temple volunteers, and of their deaths,
consumed by fire. They were the victims, sacrificed to the glory of the Hindu nation. But
the response was also one of fire on a scale not seen before.
54 Was the wreaking of death and revenge by fire a concerted strategy? A genocidal impulse
towards killing as many as possible while concealing and eradicating the evidence, the
dead bodies that were burned in big fires, literally in stacks? We cannot be sure. But the
events fit into a larger pattern of violence being staged and interpreted as being without
visible  agency,  a  form of  violence without  culpability.  These acts  are staged as  pure
events,  ready for inscription of  motives,  agency and responsibility—so pregnant with




55 Fire is powerful nothingness, a threshold, a transition that has no agency of its own and
yet can assume a sort of anonymous agency—as uncontrollable passion, as actual deadly
fires killing people, and as signs of the presence of God and the divine in a polymorphous
and inscrutable sign. Are we to understand the use of fire, arson and bombs as a form of
non-discursive politics? As series of events that, like Althusser’s policeman crying ‘hey
you’ (Althusser 1984), impels interpellation and interpretation? It is the fire itself, the
explosion, the dead bodies of the victims, and sometimes the bomber as well, that become
signs of something that may stand behind the act itself. This is a complex semiosis, a
complex series  of  signs  without  rules  attached or  proscriptive interpretations.  While
bombs are the most spectacular instantiations of this, fire is the more widespread and
mundane example of a complex sign of a will, an instantiation of some historical agency,
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an imputed will of a community, a feeling of revenge or indeed a sign of outrage. Fire is a
polymorphous sign, a strikingly performative and transformative emptiness that sucks
interpretations into it, just like it sucks oxygen into itself. Destruction by fire seems to
have its own logic, maybe even its own sovereign force conceived as punishment or an
impersonal force of revenge—but never executed by anyone in particular.
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NOTES
1. I  would like to thank Amélie Blom and Djallal Heuzé for their constructive criticism of an
earlier version of this paper. Their comments helped me to clarify and sharpen my argument
considerably.
2. See Schmitt 1922. Schmitt’s work and many of its deeply problematic assumptions have in the
recent decade been worked through by Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005). I have applied some of this
philosophical re-working to political anthropology in Hansen (2005, 2006).
3. I  have dealt  with this  in extenso in my chapters  on the Bombay riots  and the Srikrishna
Commission in Hansen (2001).
4. Quoted from Chakrabarty (2007: 54).
5. The most  succinct  statement of  this  can be found in the Mandal  Commission Report  that
recommended that reservations were extended to the so-called OBC sections, Other Backward
Classes, constituting app. 53 % of the population. For the texts and definitions of ‘community
backwardness’, see Engineer (1991: 290-94).
6. These events are detailed in several  books such as Padgaonkar (1993),  Hansen (2001),  Sen
(2007).
ABSTRACTS
What are we to make of the fact that most violence in India rarely has any visible or clear actors?
Why is most violence represented as ‘pure events’ without identifiable actors—but as ‘mobs’, as
spontaneous combustion, as spontaneous rage that arises from perceived collective grievances
and insults?  Why in a  country saturated in political  rhetoric  is  it  that  acts  of  violence have
acquired  their  own semiotic  register,  a  singular  form of  ‘political  communication’?  Fire  and
incidents of arson are at the heart of this naturalization of violence, as events without actors.
Fire  is  not  only  one of  the  densest  cultural  signifiers  in  India,  it  also  is  at  the heart  of  the
transgressions, the exceptions, the taboos, the sacrifices, the agency, the sense of communitas
that  unfold  in  times  of  heightened  conflict  and  violent  clashes  with  the  state  or  other
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communities. Drawing on examples from Mumbai and elsewhere, the paper attempts to theorize
and elaborate the nexus between fire, violence and collective sentiments.
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